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CERTIORARI AND THE MARRIAGE EQUALITY CASES 
Carl Tobias∗ 
Marriage equality has come to much of the nation. Over 2014, 
many district court rulings invalidated state proscriptions on same-
sex marriage, while four appeals courts upheld these decisions. 
However, the Sixth Circuit reversed district judgments which 
struck down bans in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee. 
Because that appellate opinion created a patchwork of differing 
legal regimes across the country, this Paper urges the Supreme 
Court to clarify marriage equality by reviewing that determination 
this Term. 
I. The New Cases 
United States v. Windsor1 provoked the recent suits,2 which 
plaintiffs filed in every state that prohibits same-sex marriage.3 
Windsor ruled that the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
contravened the Fourteenth Amendment4 by harming the dignity 
and financial and related interests of same-sex couples and their 
children.5 The majority invoked federalism without evaluating state 
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 1.  133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); see Ernest Young, United States v. Windsor and the Role of 
State Law in Defining Rights Claims, 99 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 39 (2013).   
 2.  Numerous courts invoke Windsor. For evaluations of marriage equality, see 
generally MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR (2013) and MARK SOLOMON, 
WINNING MARRIAGE (2014).  
 3.  The ACLU has pursued a number, as have local counsel. See ACLU, The ACLU’s 
Freedom to Marry Cases (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/lgbt-rights/aclus-freedom-
marry-cases. 
 4.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695–96; see also Michael Klarman, Windsor and Brown, 127 
HARV. L. REV. 127, 140 (2013).   
 5.  The Court seemingly used elevated scrutiny. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2693–96; see also 
Young, supra note 2, at 40–41. 
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bans,6 which left unclear how Windsor affects them. When 
dissenting, Chief Justice John Roberts claimed that the majority 
did not address bans’ constitutionality,7 but Justice Antonin Scalia 
contended that the notions used to invalidate DOMA might 
similarly cover them.8 
Following Windsor, two dozen district judges found that bans 
are unconstitutional; only the Eastern District of Louisiana and 
District of Puerto Rico held that bans are constitutional.9 The 
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits affirmed invalidations 
by deciding that bans violated the Fourteenth Amendment.10 In 
early October, the Justices denied each Fourth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuit certiorari petition, but they have yet to review the 
Sixth and Ninth Circuit appeals.11 
However, last November, a Sixth Circuit panel, comprised of 
Judges Jeffrey Sutton, Deborah Cook, and Martha Craig 
Daughtrey, upheld bans in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, and 
Tennessee, essentially based on federalism.12 Judge Sutton 
proposed numerous ways to envision the issue—“Originalism; 
rational basis review; animus; fundamental rights; suspect 
classifications; evolving meaning”—but deemed convincing no 
theory plaintiffs enunciated for constitutionalizing the question 
and removing the prerogative to define marriage from state voters, 
where it has remained since the country’s outset.13 More 
specifically, the jurist argued that the Constitution assigns states 
primary responsibility for marriage regulation and neither the Due 
Process Clause nor the Equal Protection Clause grants same-sex 
                                                   
 6.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694–95; see infra notes 11, 21, 24 and accompanying text. 
 7.  Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting). 
 8.  Id. at 2709–10 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 9.  ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, FEDERAL CHALLENGES TO STATE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE BANS 
22 (2015), available at http://www.afj.org/reports/latest-updates-love-and-the-law; see also 
Lyle Denniston, Court Denies One Same-Sex Marriage Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 12, 2015), 
http://www.scotusblog.com. 
 10.  Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464–65, 467–68 (9th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 
F.3d 648, 654–72 (7th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 360, 375–78, 384 (4th Cir. 
2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1208–24 (10th Cir. 2014).   
 11.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th 
Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (2014); 
Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 271 (2014); Bostic v. 
Schaefer, 760 F.3d 360 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 
F.3d 1193 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 265 (2014); see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court 
Delivers Tacit Win to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2014, at A1; ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, 
supra note 9, at 22. 
 12.  DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).   
 13.  Id. at 402–03. 
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couples a fundamental right to marry; these couples are not a 
suspect class, so he applied the rational basis test, which the 
“responsible procreation” and “wait-and-see” rationales easily 
satisfied. 
Judge Daughtrey, who dissented, criticized Sutton’s “original 
meaning” notion that the Fourteenth Amendment left marriage 
the same, by arguing that revision was not intended to desegregate 
public schools or permit interracial marriage.14 She found the 
rational basis evaluation—asserting that the ban is rational because 
gay couples do not have unintended children—so weak that it 
could not “be taken seriously.”15 To “let the people decide,” her 
foils were state constitutional amendment’s complexity and the 
U.S. Constitution’s mandate that judges determine “individual 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment,” notwithstanding public 
opinion.16 To the “wait and see” argument, Daughtrey responded 
that, absent hard data the skies have fallen, the “states as 
laboratories of democracy” trope and its restraint plea do not 
resonate in the quickly-evolving marriage debate.17 
All plaintiffs rapidly appealed.18 Each state but Tennessee filed 
before the deadline to expedite consideration and did not oppose 
review, given the issue’s significance.19 That timing permitted the 
Justices to initially examine the certiorari petitions at their January 
9 conference and decide the question this Term.20 
                                                   
 14.  Racial discrimination remained following a civil war, slavery’s termination and 14th 
Amendment ratification, so myriad cases and judicial decrees were necessary to achieve 
“even a modicum of constitutional protection.” DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 431. 
 15.  Id. at 434 (citing Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014)).  
 16.  The Justices held the people cannot order states to contravene equal protection. 
DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 435.  
 17.  Id. Judge Daughtrey lamented that her colleagues seemingly fell “prey to the 
misguided” idea that they could only honor the framers’ intent by cleaving to legislative will 
and demonizing independent courts. Id. at 436. 
 18.  E.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 
6449712 (Nov. 18, 2014) (No. 14-571). 
 19.  Respondent’s Brief in Support of a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3–4, DeBoer 
v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 WL 6449712 (Nov. 18, 
2014) (No. 14-571);, Respondent’s Brief in Opposition to a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 
Tanco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (6th Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, 2014 U.S. S. Ct. 
Briefs LEXIS 4393 (Nov. 14, 2014) (No. 14-562).  
 20.  Lyle Denniston, Same-Sex Marriage: A Simple Appeal, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 17, 2014), 
http://www.scotusblog.com.   
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II. Recommendations For The Future 
Denying the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit appeals 
indicates that the Justices might have been waiting for a decision 
that finds bans constitutional, which the Sixth Circuit affords.21 
Nevertheless, the Court may reject certiorari. It could favor federal 
appellate court, state legislative, and public resolution of the issue 
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction and, thus, respect federalism, like the 
Windsor and DeBoer majorities admonished,22 or defer to state 
lawmakers and the people, as Sutton’s citation to Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action urged.23 The Justices might 
correspondingly want to avoid the controversy that ostensibly 
results from the Court’s countrywide disposition of contested social 
issues.24 
However, in light of marriage equality’s unclear status across 
the U.S., the Justices should deem ideas which favor certiorari 
more convincing. Several are responsive to the above contentions. 
For instance, Windsor seemingly finds that pursuit of individual 
rights may override federalism;25 Schuette deserves little deference, 
as it relates to affirmative action, which is a strikingly different 
constituent of equal protection law;26 and the Constitution assigns 
federal judges responsibility to determine whether bans violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment.27 
Perhaps more significantly, the Court should accept a case to 
resolve a circuit split which allows diverse legal systems in the Sixth 
Circuit jurisdictions and much of the nation, and which fosters 
                                                   
 21.  Id.; see Robert Barnes, Gay Couples Wed in Miami, as Justices Meet on Issue, WASH. 
POST, Jan. 6, 2015, at A1; Denniston, supra note 9; supra text accompanying note 11 
(denying appeals and suggesting the Court may accept new petitions). 
 22.  Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 398 (4th Cir. 2014) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting); 
Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1231 (10th Cir. 2014) (Kelly, J., dissenting); supra text 
accompanying notes 5, 12. 
 23.  “Debate on sensitive issues [may] shade into rancor [but] does not justify removing 
[them] from voters. Democracy does not presume [some subjects are] too divisive or too 
profound for public debate.” He said “real” people favored and opposed both initiatives, 
while gay persons and states should not be treated as abstractions. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 409 
(citing Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014)).   
 24.  Abortion is the classic example. Klarman, supra note 4, at 146–48. Strategic factors 
respecting how Justices might vote on the merits may, but ought not, influence decisions 
regarding certiorari. 
 25.  Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379; Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1228; see supra notes 5, 8, 22. But see 
supra text accompanying notes 6, 23.  
 26.  Bostic, 760 F.3d at 379; supra text accompanying notes 16, 25. But see supra note 23. 
More Justices recently appear opposed to affirmative action. Fisher v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2411 
(2013). 
 27.  See supra text accompanying note 16. 
 32 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Online [Vol. 48 
 
uncertainty for 21 million Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and 
Tennessee citizens and even larger numbers elsewhere throughout 
the increasingly mobile U.S.28 The patchwork, which makes 
marriages that are legal in some states invalid in others, has an 
enormous impact on the day-to-day lives of “real” persons for 
whom Sutton voices great concern.29 The several hundred same-sex 
couples who married after Eastern District of Michigan Judge 
Bernard Friedman invalidated the ban and before his decision was 
stayed furnish cogent examples, because the Sixth Circuit reversal 
rendered their marital status unclear.30 Rejecting the Fourth, 
Seventh and Tenth Circuit appeals and the Justices’ denial of stays 
in jurisdictions, which include Alaska, Florida, and South Carolina, 
concomitantly mean that thousands of same-sex couples who have 
married since October or who may wed in the future could 
confront legal uncertainty should the Court reject certiorari now 
or later find that bans are constitutional.31 Denying appeals would 
also make residents of the four Sixth Circuit states resort to the 
burdensome, prolonged state constitutional amendment process.32 
Put simply, the many affected people warrant final resolution of 
their marital status.33 
Conclusion 
Marriage equality is the law of 37 states, but not 14. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court must expeditiously grant 
certiorari, determine whether the bans contravene the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and clarify the marital status of thousands of 
individuals. 
                                                   
 28.  See, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2014 WL 6449712 
(2014); Henry v. Hodges, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2014 WL 5907570 (2014). 
 29. See supra text accompanying note 23 (Sutton’s concern). 
 30.  Some filed a recognition suit. Caspar v. Snyder, 2:14-CV-11499 (E.D. Mich. 2014); 
Tresa Baldas, Gay Marriage Showdown heads to Cincinnati, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Aug. 6, 2014, 
at A1. Indiana and Utah couples faced that issue, but the 7th and 10th Circuit certiorari 
denials vitiated it. See supra text accompanying note 11; see also Michael Auslen, Counties 
Issuing Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 27, 2014, 
http://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2014/06/26/interactive-counties-same-sex-
marriage-licenses/11425011/; Evans v. Utah, 2014 WL 2048343 (D. Utah 2014) (recognizing 
same-sex marriages). 
 31.  See supra text accompanying note 11. 
 32.  E.g., KY. CONST. § 256; TENN. CONST. art. 11, § 3; see supra text accompanying note 
16. 
 33.  Chaos in Florida, Indiana, Michigan, Utah and elsewhere evokes the concern 
about political chaos that justified deciding Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Barnes, supra 
note 21; see supra text accompanying notes 30–31. 
